

# Melika Liporace

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## References

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**Fernando Vega-Redondo**  
Dept. of Decision Sciences  
Bocconi University  
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**Massimo Morelli**  
Dept. of Social & Political Sciences  
Bocconi University  
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**Nenad Kos**  
Dept. of Economics  
Bocconi University  
Contact: 🏠 ✉

## Research

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### Interests

*Primary: Microeconomic Theory, Networks, Information*  
*Secondary: Political Economy, Behavioral Economics*

### Working Papers

#### **4 Things Nobody tells you about Online News: a Model for the New News Market (JMP)**

Social media create a new type of incentives for news producers. Consumers share content, influence the visibility of articles and determine the advertisement revenues ensuing. I study the new incentives created by sharing and evaluate the potential quality of ad-funded online news. Producers rely on a subset of rational and unbiased consumers to spread news articles. The resulting news has low precision and ambiguous welfare effects. Producers' incentive to invest in news quality increases with the private knowledge of the topic; hence, when information is most needed, the generated news tends to be of lesser quality. Competition does not necessarily improve news quality – it does so only if the sharing network is *sufficiently* dense. While ad-funded online news occasionally helps consumers take better decisions, it creates welfare mostly through entertainment. Some interventions, such as flagging wrong articles, substantially improve the outcome; other approaches, such as quality certification, do not.

#### **Persuasion in Networks: a Model with Heterogenous Agents**

This paper studies a Bayesian persuasion problem in a connected world. A sender wants to induce receivers to take some actions by committing to a signal structure about a payoff-relevant state. I wonder about the role of a network on information provision when signals are shared among neighbors. Receivers differ in their prior beliefs; the sender wants to persuade some receivers without dissuading the others. I present and characterize novel strategies through which the network is exploited. Were receivers' priors homogenous, such strategies would underperform with respect to a public signal. However, when priors are heterogenous, these strategies can prove useful to the sender. In particular, if the average degree of the nodes who should not be dissuaded is sufficiently low, strategies exploiting the network convince more receivers than public signals, conditional on the adverse state realizing. Furthermore, I show how connectivity can be beneficial to the sender, in particular in segregated networks; and how strategies exploiting the network perform better when one group is especially hard to persuade.

#### **When Conflict is a Political Strategy: a Model of Diversionary Incentives**

This model revisits the diversionary argument of war by proposing a new mechanism: a population that rebels during a conflict weakens the country's military position; this threat discourages the population to attempt a coup. Being at war thus allows a leader to impose demanding policies without being overthrown. In this context, I show how "rally around the flag" reactions to conflict can be both rational and efficient. I further prove that purely diversionary incentives exist: international tensions can be initiated with the only goal of raising popular support about the conflict. Finally, I discuss long-run effects, by allowing rebellion means to be flexible. I find that the population can voluntarily renounce to the freedom to rebel; alternatively, conflicts occur in equilibrium. The strength of the enemy's threat increases the prevalence of barriers to rebellion, while open conflicts are non-monotonically linked to it.

## Work in Progress

- The No-Substitution Curse (with Massimo Morelli)
- The Formation of Gas Provision Networks (with Massimo Morelli)
- A Key Player Analysis with Heterogenous Catching Costs (with Magdalena Domínguez)
- Be Right, or Be Conform: Learning with Information Avoidance

## Seminars

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### Invited Talks

University of Freiburg (Germany)

### Conferences & Workshops

#### 2021:

- Econometric Society European Summer Meeting
- Max Planck Institute PolEcon Summer School
- XV GRASS Workshop
- Warwick PhD conference
- Ruhr Graduate School Doctoral Conference
- Portuguese Economic Journal Meeting
- Sassari and Ca'Foscari PhD Conference
- European Economics and Finance Society
- Jornadas de Economia Industrial
- Bocconi internal seminars

#### 2020:

- EEA Summer Congress
- Vilfredo Pareto Doctorate Economics Workshop
- Economic and Business Review Conference

**Discussant for:** EDGE Jamboree 2021, XV GRASS 2021, RGS 2021, Bocconi internal seminars

## Relevant Working Experience

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### Teaching assistantships

*Duties include in-class teaching, material preparation, grading, office hours*

#### **Social and Economic Networks**

*Course Director: Fernando Vega-Redondo, elective for several M.Sc. Programs*

*Jan. 2019–July 2020*

#### **Decisions and Organizations**

*Course Director: Massimo Morelli, compulsory for some M.Sc. Programs*

*Sep. 2019–Jan. 2020*

#### **Introduction to Microeconomics**

*Course Director: Alfredo DiTillio, compulsory for all B.Sc. Programs*

*Sept. 2017–Jan. 2022*

### Tutorships

*Duties include grading, office hours*

#### **Economics and Politics**

*Course Directors: Mara Squicciarini; Carlo Schwarz; Guido Tabellini, compulsory for some M.Sc. Programs*

*Jan. 2019–July 2021*

#### **Economics of Institutions and Culture**

*Course Director: Mara Squicciarini, elective for several B.Sc. Programs*

*Jan. 2019–July 2020*

## Research Assistanship

<b>Power to Hurt and Rebel Gains in Civil Wars</b> <i>Scientific Coordinator: Kerim Can Kavakli,</i>	<i>Feb. 2021–May 2021</i>
<b>The Political Economy of Power Relations</b> <i>Scientific Coordinator: Massimo Morelli</i>	<i>Sep. 2020–Feb. 2021</i>
<b>Political Connections and International Firms Activity</b> <i>Scientific Coordinator: Matthieu Couttenier</i>	<i>Aug. 2014–Sep. 2014</i>

## Awards

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<b>Scholarship for most promising Bocconi Ph.D. Candidates</b> Fondazione Romeo ed Enrica Invernizzi	<i>Sept. 2020–Jan. 2022</i>
<b>Fully funded Merit-Based Ph.D. Scholarship</b> Bocconi University	<i>Sept. 2016–Aug. 2020</i>

## Education

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<b>Ph.D. in Economics and Finance</b> Bocconi University, Milan, Italy Advisor: Fernando Vega-Redondo	<i>Sept. 2016–Jan. 2022</i>
<b>M.Sc. in Economics</b> University of Lausanne, HEC Lausanne, Switzerland Advisor: Dominic Rohner	<i>Sept. 2013–Jan. 2016</i>
<b>B.Sc. in Economics</b> University of Lausanne, HEC Lausanne, Switzerland	<i>Sept. 2010–June 2013</i>

## Studies Abroad & Summer Schools

Summer School in the Political Economy of Conflicts, Max Planck Institute	<i>Summer 2021</i>
Summer School in Behavioral Economics, Bonn University	<i>Summer 2019</i>
Exchange Semester, University of Mannheim	<i>Fall 2014</i>

## Languages & Programing

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### Languages

French	Native
English	Fluent
Italian	Proficient

### Programing

LaTeX	Advanced
Stata	Intermediate
Python	Intermediate

## Personal

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Swiss Citizenship